NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Sinking of the U.S. Small Passenger Vessel Panther
Near Everglades City, Florida
December 30, 2002
NTSB/MAR-04/01
This is a synopsis from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 30, 2002, the U.S. small passenger vessel Panther, a 31-foot open wood-and-fiberglass boat operated by Everglades National Park Boat Tours, was on its third tour of the day in the Ten Thousand Islands area of Everglades National Park, Florida, with 33 passengers on board (including 5 children) plus a master. Midway through the tour, shortly after 1430, the vessel sank in about 12 feet of water in Indian Key Pass, about 3 1/2 miles from the National Park Service visitor center near Everglades City. Three nearby vessels responded to the accident and rescued all the passengers and the master from the water. The U.S. Coast Guard launched a search-and-rescue operation that involved five Coast Guard stations in south Florida; however, responders did not find any passengers in the water. No fatalities resulted from the accident, but one passenger suffered a serious injury. Damage to the Panther was estimated at $60,000. The Coast Guard reported that costs of the search-and-rescue operation exceeded $50,000.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Panther’s sinking was flooding through a hull breach, which resulted from an earlier grounding and which Everglades National Park Boat Tours neglected to address, instead choosing to operate the vessel with a known failure of watertight integrity and inappropriately relying on the bilge pumps to keep the vessel afloat, thus continually putting its passengers at risk.
Based on its investigation, the Safety Board identified the adequacy of the following as safety issues:
· Company operations;
· Company’s preventive maintenance program; and
· Lifejacket stowage.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The weather and sea conditions and the condition of the vessel’s engine were not factors in this accident.
2. None of the following were factors in this accident: the master’s health, the use of preion or nonpreion medications, fatigue, alcohol, or illicit drugs.
3. The owner was aware that his masters frequently took their vessels where they were susceptible to grounding, but the owner failed to prevent this practice.
4. The grounding in early December 2002 caused a fracture in the Panther’s hull at the strut connection that eventually sank the vessel.
5. The owner, maintenance men, and masters knew that the Panther was operating with a less-than-normal freeboard for about 2 weeks before the sinking and were aware that the vessel was continually taking on water but took no action to identify and eliminate the source; instead, they incorrectly relied on the bilge pumps to dewater the vessel, which placed the passengers at risk.
6. Had the master acted correctly by ensuring that his vessel was safe to operate, he would not have taken the Panther on the voyage during which it sank.
7. The Safety Board cannot determine whether the Panther’s starboard bilge pump was operating at the time of the accident.
8. It is likely that the Panther’s high-level bilge alarm was not connected at the time of the accident.
9. While the master’s maneuvering of the Panther was in accordance with its normal operation and may have been acceptable if the vessel’s hull had not been breached, his failure to notice that his vessel had a dangerously reduced freeboard and was taking on water through the freeing ports shows that he was inattentive to the safety of his passengers.
10. The wood rot discovered during the postaccident examination of the Panther indicates that the owner failed to maintain the material condition of the vessel.
11. Had Everglades National Park Boat Tours had a comprehensive maintenance and repair program in place that included, but was not limited to, drydocking the vessel after a grounding, and had the company followed such a program, the vessel would have been drydocked, the fracture in the bottom would have been discovered and repaired, and the accident would have been avoided.
12. Everglades National Park Boat Tours operated its vessels in a substandard manner.
13. The lifejacket stowage arrangement on board the Panther prevented the passengers from retrieving lifejackets.
14. The timely arrival of other vessels to the scene of the Panther sinking prevented loss of life in this accident.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Panther’s sinking was flooding through a hull breach, which resulted from an earlier grounding and which Everglades National Park Boat Tours neglected to address, instead choosing to operate the vessel with a known failure of watertight integrity and inappropriately relying on the bilge pumps to keep the vessel afloat, thus continually putting its passengers at risk.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
NEW SAFETY RECOMMENDATION
As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendation:
To the National Park Service:
Require that concessionaire companies operating passenger vessels in your jurisdictions develop and implement a preventive maintenance program for all systems affecting the safe operation of their vessels, including the hull and mechanical and electrical systems.
Establish oversight procedures to verify, on a regular basis, that concessionaires who operate passenger vessels in the national park system, have adequate preventive maintenance and safety programs.
Previously Issued Recommendations Resulting from This Accident Investigation
To the National Park Service:
3. Establish oversight procedures to verify, on a regular basis, that tour boat concessionaires who operate in the national park system carry an appropriately sized lifejacket for every child on board. (M-03-1)
Safety Recommendation M-03-1 is discussed in the "Actions Taken Since the Accident" section of this report. The Safety Board has classified Safety Recommendation M-03-1 as "Openâ€â€ÂÂAcceptable Response
Previously Issued Recommendations Classified in This Report
To the U.S. Coast Guard:
4. Issue a directive to small passenger vessel operators to review the distribution of lifejackets on board their vessels and to ensure that the lifejackets are accessible and segregated. (M-02-13)
Safety Recommendation M-02-13 (previously classified "Openâ€â€ÂÂAcceptable Response") is classified "Closedâ€â€ÂÂAcceptable Action" in the "Lifejacket Stowage" section of this report.
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